Through an interdisciplinary perspective integrating behavior, neurobiology and evolution, we present a cognitive framework underpinning the development of 'time in mind' in animals (phylogeny) and humans (ontogeny). We distinguish between conscious processing of events immediately available (in the present) to those that are hypothetical (in the past or future). The former is present in animals and neonates, whereas the latter emerges later in phylogeny and ontogeny (around 4 years of age in humans) and is related to the development of episodic memory (expanded working memory, complex actions, social-cognitive abilities). We suggest that forms of temporal representation that rely upon current bodily sensation across time, space, and action (through embodied interoceptive and motor systems) may be critical causal factors for the evolution of mental time travel.
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Introduction
The aim of the current article is to identify potential causal mechanisms at the evolutionary, neurobiological, and developmental levels that may better explain how the mind and brain systems give rise to our subjective sense of time. Although mammals and corvids show some signs of mental time travel, (as evidenced, for example, by episodic memory or forward planning; see [1-4] a for greater discussion of non-human animal abilities), humans have functionally superior mental abilities that allow them to consciously think and act upon events (either intentionally or unintentionally) in the past and future [1] . We will suggest that this ability probably had some evolutionary advantage, perhaps through its relation to the increase in the size of hunter-gather social networks (and cooperative hunting practices) that became connected over vast distances, thereby placing demands for social-cognitive abilities and past or future thinking -beyond the 'here-and-now' [5] . We will also suggest that temporal (e.g., duration) estimations may be based on interoceptive information that extends beyond the temporal limits of working memory, thereby engendering a sense of extended time and self [6 ] . This has also been proposed as necessary for the emergence of episodic memory [7] , itself a requirement for thinking about hypothetical events in the future (see Figure 1) .
The psychological present: working memory and attention
The 'psychological' or 'specious' present has a long history in the study of human psychology and refers to the conscious state of 'now'. The existence of an approximately 3 second [8] or even 5-8 second correspondence window that situates events within the conscious state of 'now' has been contested [9] , with the assertion that it is instead of no fixed duration, but rather, is based on the duration of an experiential process and the capacity to apprehend information into a unified group that has not yet been stored in memory [10] . The notion of the subjective present as a mental platform, with a limited temporal boundary, that processes some 'online' integration of current events over a brief period of objective time in consciousness (via controlled attention) resonates well with notions of short-term memory, working memory and the episodic buffer [11] . The idea here is that discrete experiential platforms, 'experiential moments', or phenomenal 'presents', are integrated in dynamic succession such that time 'flows' between these platforms and is not experienced as static.
Sensitivity to the temporal qualities of stimulus events is observed in many species, chiefly in the ability to learn conditional relations between events. Studies of Pavlovian and operant conditioning in animals (using trace eyeblink conditioning and peak-interval procedures respectively) reveal a 'ramping up' over many trials of the conditioned or operant response to a peak amplitude around the 'expected' criterion (CS-US/PI) interval duration. Animals are also capable of linking the passage of time with ongoing behavior, and may even use actions to parse or discriminate an interval [12] . These interval-timing-based responses may appear to extend for durations beyond the breadth of the psychological present. However, most interval timing models (e.g., pacemaker or cortical oscillations models) require the 'onset' (or re-setting) of timing mechanisms
